Abstract. We present a digital signature scheme based on the computational difficulty of integer factorization.
1. Introduction. The idea of a "digital signature" first appeared in Diffie and Hellman's seminal paper, New Directions in Cryptography [DH76] . They propose that each user A publish a "public key" (used for validating signatures), while keeping secret a "secret key" (used for producing signatures). In their scheme user A's signature for a message M is a value which depends on M and on A's secret key, such that anyone can verify the validity of A's signature using A's public key. However, while knowing A's public key is sufficient to allow one to validate A's signatures, it does not allow one to easily forge A's signatures. They also proposed a way of implementing signatures based on "trap-door functions" (see 2.1.1).
The notion of a digital signature is useful and is a legal replacement for handwritten signatures [LM78] , [MAT9] . However, a number of technical problems arise if digital signatures are implemented using trap-door functions as suggested by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] ; these problems have been addressed and solved in part elsewhere. For example, [GMY83] showed how to handle arbitrary or sparse message sets and how to ensure that if an enemy sees previous signatures (for messages that he has not chosen) it does not help him to forge new signatures (this is a "nonadaptive chosenmessage attack"; see 2.2). The signature scheme presented here, using fundamentally different ideas than those presented by Diffie and Hellman, advances the state of the art of signature schemes with provable security properties even further; it has the following important characteristics:
What we prove to be difficult is forgery, and not merely obtaining the secret key used by the signing algorithm (or obtaining an efficient equivalent algorithm).
Forgery is proven to be difficult for a "most general" enemy who can mount an adaptive chosen-message attack. (An enemy who can use the real signer as "an oracle" cannot in time polynomial in the size of the public key forge a signature for any message whose signature was not obtained from the real signer.) In contrast to all previous published work on this problem, we prove the scheme invulnerable against such an adaptive attack where each message whose signature is requested may depend on all signatures previously obtained from the real signer. We believe that an adaptive chosen-message attack is the most powerful attack possible for an enemy who is restricted to using the signature scheme in a natural manner.
The properties we prove about the new signature scheme do not depend in any way on the set of messages to be signed or on any assumptions about a probability distribution on the message set.
Our scheme can be generalized so that it can be based on "hard" problems other than factoring whenever one can create claw-free trap-door pair generators.
Our scheme can be based on any family of pairs of claw-free permutations, yielding a signature scheme that is invulnerable to a chosen-message attack even if the claw-free permutations are vulnerable to a chosen-message attack when used to make a trap-door signature scheme (see 2.1.1).
Fundamental ideas in the construction are the use of randomization, signing by using two authentication steps (the first step authenticates a random value which is used in the second step to authenticate the message), and the use of a treelike branching authentication structure to produce short signatures.
We note that our signature scheme is not of the simple Diffie-Hellman "trap-door" type. For example, a given message can have many signatures.
Our signature scheme is seemingly "paradoxical," in that we prove that forgery is equivalent to factoring even if the enemy uses an adaptive chosen-message attack. We can restate the paradox as follows:
Any general technique for forging signatures can be used as a "black box" in a construction that enables the enemy to factor one of the signer's public moduli (he has two in our scheme), but The technique of "forging" signatures by getting the real signer to play the role of the "black box" (i.e., getting the real signer to produce some desired genuine signatures) does not help the enemy to factor either of the signer's moduli.
Resolving this paradox was previously believed to be impossible and contradictory ([Wi80] misled by Rivest) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 2 we present definitions of what it means to "break" a signature scheme and what it means to "attack" a signature scheme. In 3 we review previously proposed signature schemes. In 4 we review more closely the nature of the "paradox," and discuss how it can be resolved. Section 5 defines some useful conventions and notation, and 6 describes the complexitytheoretic foundations of our scheme. In 7 we give some of the fundamental notions for our signature scheme, and in 8 we give the details. In 9 we prove that it has the desired properties. In the last section we discuss some ways to improve the running time and memory requirements of this scheme.
2. Fundamental notions. To properly characterize the results of this paper, it is helpful to answer the following questions:
What is a digital signature scheme? What kinds of attacks can the enemy mount against a digital signature scheme? What is meant by "breaking" the signature scheme?
Little attention has been devoted so far to precisely answering these questions. For instance, signature schemes have been generically called "secure" without specifying against what kind of attack. This way, it would not be surprising that "secure" signature schemes were later broken by an unforseen attack. We hope that the classification we propose in this section may prove useful in resolving unpleasant ambiguities.
2.1. What is a digital signature scheme? A digital signature scheme contains the following components:
A security parameter k, which is chosen by the user when he creates his public and secret keys. The parameter k determines a number of quantities (length of signatures, length of signable messages, running time of the signing algorithm, overall security, etc).
A message space , which is the set of messages to which the signature algorithm may be applied. Without loss of generality, we assume in this paper that all messages are represented as binary strings, that is, {0, 1}/. To ensure that the entire signing process is polynomial in the security parameter, we assume that the length of the messages to be signed is bounded by kc, for some constant c > 0.
A signature bound B, which is an integer bounding the total number of signatures that can be produced with an instance of the signature scheme. Any of the above algorithms may be "randomized" algorithms that make use of auxiliary random bit stream inputs. We note that G must be a randomized algorithm, since part of its output is the secret key, which must be unpredictable to an adversary. The signing algorithm r may be randomized--we note in particular that our signing algorithm is randomized and is capable of producing many different signatures for the same message. In general, the verification algorithm need not be randomized, and ours is not. We note that there are other kinds of "signature" problems that are not dealt with here; the most notable being the "contract-signing problem" where two parties wish to exchange their signatures to an agreed-upon contract simultaneously ( Diffie and Hellman proposed that A use a "trap-door function" f: informally, a function for which it is easy to evaluate f(x) for any argument x but for which, given only f(x), it is computationally infeasible to find any y with f(y)=f(x) without the secret "trap-door" information. According to their suggestion, A publishes f and any one can validate a signature by checking that f(signature)= message. Only A possesses the "trap-door" information allowing him to invert f: f-(message) signature. (Trap-door functions will be formally defined in 6.) We call any signature scheme that fits into this model (i.e., uses trap-door functions and signs by applying f-to the message) a trap-door signature scheme.
We note that not all signature schemes are trap-door schemes, although most of the ones proposed in the literature are of this type.
2.2. Kinds of attacks. We distinguish two basic kinds of attacks:
Key-only attacks in which the enemy knows only the real signer's public key, and Message attacks where the enemy is able to examine some signatures corresponding to either known or chosen-messages before his attempt to break the scheme.
We identify the following four kinds of message attacks, which are characterized by how the messages whose signatures the enemy sees are chosen. Here A denotes the user whose signature method is being attacked.
Known-message attack. The enemy is given access to signatures for a set of messages ml, , mr. The messages are known to the enemy but are not chosen by him.
Generic chosen-message attack. Here the enemy is allowed to obtain from A valid signatures for a chosen list of messages ml," ", mt before he attempts to break A's signature scheme. These messages are chosen by the enemy, but they are fixed and independent of A's public key (for example the mi's may be chosen at random). This attack is nonadaptive: the entire message list is constructed before any signatures are seen. This attack is "generic" since it does not depend on the A's public key; the same attack is used against everyone.
Directed chosen-message attack. This is similar to the generic chosen-message attack, except that the list of messages to be signed may be created after seeing A's public key but before any signatures are seen. (The attack is still nonadaptive.) This attack is "directed" against a particular user A.
Adaptive chosen-message attack. This is more general yet: here the enemy is also allowed to use A as an "oracle"; not only may he request from A signatures of messages which depend on A's public key but he may also request signatures of messages which depend additionally on previously obtained signatures. The above attacks are listed in order of increasing severity, with the adaptive chosen-message attack being the most severe natural attack an enemy can mount. That the adaptive chosen-message attack is a natural one can be seen by considering the case of a notary public who must sign more-or-less arbitrary documents on demand.
In general, the user of a signature scheme would like to feel that he may sign arbitrary documents prepared by others without fear of compromising his security.
2.3. What does it mean to "break" a signature scheme? One might say that the enemy has "broken" user A's signature scheme if his attack allows him to do any of the following with a nonnegligible probability:
A total break. Compute A's secret trap-door information.
Universalforgery. Find an efficient signing algorithm functionally equivalent to A's signing algorithm (based on possibly different but equivalent trap-door information).
Selective forgery. Forge a signature for a particular message chosen a priori by the enemy.
Existential forgery. Forge a signature for at least one message. The enemy has no control over the message whose signature he obtains, so. it may be random or nonsensical. Consequently this forgery may only be a minor nuisance to A. Note that to forge a signature means to produce a new signature; it is not forgery to obtain from A a valid signature for a message and then claim that he has now "forged" that signature, any more than passing around an authentic handwritten signature is an instance of forgery. For example, in a chosen-message attack it does not constitute selective forgery to obtain from the real signer a signature for the target message M.
Clearly, the kinds of "breaks" are listed above in order of decreasing severity; the least the enemy might hope for is to succeed with an existential forgery.
We say that a scheme is respectively totally breakable, universally forgeable, selectively forgeable or existentially forgeable if it is breakable in one of the above senses. Note that it is more desirable to prove that a scheme is not even existentially forgeable than to prove that it is not totally breakable. The above list is not exhaustive; there may be other ways of "breaking" a signature scheme which fit in between those listed, or are somehow different in character.
We utilize here the most realistic notion of forgery, in which we say that a forgery algorithm succeeds if it succeeds probabilistically with a nonnegligible probability. To make this notion precise, we say that the forgery algorithm succeeds if its chance of success is at least as large as one over a polynomial in the security parameter k.
To say that the scheme is "broken," we not only insist that the forgery algorithm succeed with a nonnegligible probability, but also that it must run in probabilistic polynomial time.
We note here that the characteristics of the signature scheme may depend on its message space in subtle ways. For example, a scheme may be existentially forgeable for a message space but not existentially forgeable if restricted to a message space which is a sufficiently small subset of .
The next section exemplifies these notions by reviewing previously proposed signature schemes.
3. Previous signature schemes and their security. In this section we list a number of previously proposed signature schemes and briefly review some facts about their security.
(1) Trap-door signature schemes [DH76] . Any trap-door signature scheme is existentially forgeable with a key-only attack since a valid (message, signature) pair can be created by beginning with a random "signature" and applying the public verification algorithm to obtain the corresponding "message." A common heuristic for handling this problem in practice is to require that the message space be sparse (i.e., requiring that very few strings actually represent messagesmfor example this can be enforced by having each message contain a reasonably long checksum). In this case this specific attack is not likely to result in a successful existential forgery.
(2) Rivest-Shamir- (9) . Totally breaking this scheme using an adaptive chosen-message attack has been shown to be as hard as factoring. However, Pollard [Po84] has recently been able to show that the "OSS" signature scheme is universally forgeable in practice using just a key-only attack; he developed an algorithm to forge a signature for any given message without obtaining the secret trap-door information.
A more recent "cubic" version has recently been shown to be universally forgeable in practice using just a key-only attack (also by Pollard However, it is true (and was noticed by Rabin) that an enemy might totally break the scheme using a directed chosen-message attack. By asking A to sign a value x 2 mod n where x was picked at random, the enemy would obtain with probability another square root y of x 2 such that gcd (x + y, n) was a prime factor of n.
Rabin suggested that one could overcome this problem by, for example, having the signer concatenate a fairly long randomly chosen pad U to the message before signing it. In this way the enemy cannot force A to extract a square root of any particular number.
However, the reader may now observe that the proof of the equivalence of selective forgery to factoring no longer works for the modified scheme. That is, being able to selectively forge no longer enables the enemy to directly extract square roots and thus to factor. Of course, breaking this equivalence was really the whole point of making the modification.
4.1. The paradox. We now "prove" that it is impossible to have a signature scheme for which it is both true that forgery is provably equivalent to factoring, and yet the scheme is invulnerable to adaptive chosen-message attacks. The argument is essentially the same as the one given in [Wi80] . By forgery we mean in this section any of universal, selective, or existential forgery; we assume that we are given a proof that forgery of the specified type is equivalent to factoring.
Let us begin by considering this given proof. The main part of the proof presumably goes as follows: given a subroutine for forging signatures, a constructive method is specified for factoring. (The other part of the equivalence, which shows that factoring enables forgery, is usually easy, since factoring usually enables the enemy to totally break the scheme.)
But it is trivial then to show that an adaptive chosen-message attack enables an enemy to totally break the scheme. The enemy merely executes the constructive method for factoring given in the proof, using the real signer instead of the forgery subroutine! That is, whenever he needs to execute the forgery subroutine to obtain the signature of a message, he merely performs an "adaptive chosen-message attack" step--getting the real user to sign the desired message. In the end the unwary user has enabled the enemy to factor his modulus! (If the proof reduces factoring to universal or selective forgery, the enemy has to get the real user to sign a particular message. If the proof reduces factoring to existential forgery, the enemy need only get him to sign anything at all.) 4.2. Breaking the paradox. How can one hope to get around the apparent contradictory natures of equivalence to factoring and invulnerability to an adaptive chosenmessage attack?
The key idea in resolving the paradox is to have the constructive proof that forgery is as hard as factoring be a uniform proof which makes essential use of the fact that the forger can forge for arbitrary public keys with a nonnegligible probability of success. However, in "real life" a signer will only produce signatures for a particular public key. Thus the constructive proof cannot be applied in "real life" (by asking the real signer to unwittingly play the role of the forger) to factor. In our scheme this concept is implemented using the notion of "random rooting." Each user publishes not only his two composite moduli nl and n2, but also a "random root" r. This value r is used when validating the user's signatures. The paradox is resolved in our case as follows:
It is provably equivalent to factoring for an enemy to have a uniform algorithm for forging; uniform in the sense that if for all pairs of composite numbers n and n2 if the enemy can randomly forge signatures for a significant fraction of the possible random roots r, then he can factor either n or n2.
* The above proof requires that the enemy be able to pick r himself--the forgery subroutine is fed triples (n, n, r), where the r part is chosen by the enemy according to the procedure specified in the constructive proof. However, in "real life" the user has picked a fixed r at random to put in his public key, so an adaptive chosen-message attack will not enable the enemy to "forge" signatures corresponding to any other values of r. Thus the constructive method given in the proof cannot be applied! More details can be found in 9.
5. General notation and conventions.
5.1. Notation and conventions for strings. Let a Co(ll.. "x be a binary string, then c will denote the integer Yk=o ak 2x-(Note that a given integer may have several denotations, but only one of a given length.) The strings in {0, 1}* are ordered as follows: if a and/3 are binary strings, we write a </3 if there exists a string y such that a is a prefix of y, y has exactly the same length as/3, and </</3.
If is a /c-bit string, we let DFS (i)= {/3[/3 <-i}. (Imagine a full binary tree of depth /c whose root is labelled e, and the left (right) son of a node labelled a is a0 (a l) and let DFS be the Depth First Search algorithm that starts at the root and explores the left son of any node before the right son of that node. Then DFS (i) represents the set of nodes visited by DFS up to and including the time when it reaches node i.) Note that DFS (i) contains the empty string.
5.2. Notation and conventions for probabilistic algorithms. We introduce some generally useful notation and conventions for discussing probabilistic algorithms. (We make the natural assumption that all parties, including the enemy, may make use of probabilistic methods.)
We emphasize the number of inputs received by an algorithm as follows. If algorithm A receives only one input we write "A(. )," if it receives two inputs we write "A(.,. )," and so on.
We write "PS" for "probability space;" in this paper we only consider countable probability spaces. In fact, we only deal with probability spaces arising from probabilistic algorithms.
If A(. is a probabilistic algorithm then, for any input i, the notation A(i) refers to the PS which assigns to the string o-the probability that A, on input i, outputs o-.
We point out the special case that A takes no inputs; in this case the notation A refers to the algorithm itself, whereas the notation A( refers to the PS defined by running A with no input. If S is a PS, we denote by Ps(e) the probability that S associates with element e. Also, we denote by [S] the set of elements which S gives positive probability. In the case that [S] is a singleton set {e} we will use S to denote the value e; this is in agreement with traditional notation. (For instance, if A(. is an algorithm that, on input i, outputs 3, then we may write A(2)= 8 instead of [A(2)] {8}.) Iff(. and g(., .) are probabilistic algorithms thenf(g(., .)) is the probabilistic algorithm obtained by composing f and g (i.e., running f on g's output). For any inputs x, y,... the associated probability space is denoted f(g(x, y,...)).
If S is a PS, then x-S denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element randomly selected according to S; that is, x is assigned the value e with probability Ps(e).
The notation P(p(x,y,...)lxS; y T;...) will then denote the probability that the predicate p(x, y, .) will be true, after the (ordered) execution of the algorithms x -S, y -T, etc. We let t denote the set of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. We assume that a natural representation of these algorithms as binary strings is used. By 1 k we denote the binary representation of integer k, i.e., k 6. The complexity theoretic basis of the new scheme. A particular instance of our scheme can be constructed if integer factorization is computationally difficult. However, we will present our scheme in a general manner without assuming any particular problem to be intractable. This clarifies the exposition, and helps to establish the true generality of the proposed scheme. We do this by introducing the notion of a "claw-free permutation pair," and by showing the existence of such objects under the assumption that integer factorization is difficult.
This section builds up the relevant concepts and definitions in stages. In 6.1 we give a careful definition of the notions of a trap-door permutation and a trap-door permutation generator. These notions are not directly used in this paper, but serve as a simple example of the use of our notation. (Furthermore, no previous definition in the literature was quite so comprehensive.) The reader may, if he wishes, skip 6.1 without great loss.
In 6.2 we define claw-free permutation pairs and claw-free permutation pair generators.
In 6.3 we show how to construct claw-free permutation pair generators under the assumption that factoring is difficult. Finally, in 6.4 we show how to construct an infinite family of pairwise claw-free permutations, given a generating pair fo, fl, of claw-free permutations. Altogether, then, this section provides the underlying definitions and assumptions required for constructing our signature scheme. The actual construction of our signature scheme will be given in 7 and 8. It is hard to invert f without knowing f's trapdoor.
We can interpret the two properties above by saying that any user A can easily randomly select a pair of permutations, (f, f-l), inverses of each other. This will enable A to easily evaluate and invert f; if now A publicizes f and keeps secret f-l, then inverting f will be hard for all other users.
In the informal discussion above, we used the terms "easy" and "hard." The term "easy" can be interpreted as "in polynomial time"; "hard," however, is of more difficult interpretation. By saying that f is hard to invert we cannot possibly mean that fcannot be easily evaluated at any of its arguments. We mean, instead, that f-is hard to evaluate at a random argument. Thus, if one wants (as we do) to use trap-door functions to generate problems computationally hard for an "adversary," he must be For example, any f can be easily inverted at the image of a fixed argument, say 0. In fact, we may consider inverting algorithms that, on inputs x and f, first check whether x =f(0). able to randomly select a point in the domain off and f-1. This operation is easy for all currently known candidates of a trap-door permutation, and we explicitly assume it to be easy in our formal treatment. 
We make the following informal remarks corresponding to parts of the above definition.
(1) This condition makes it explicit that it is possible to sample the domain of f in a uniform manner. 
for some k and trap-door permutation generator G.
6.2. "Claw-free" permutation pairs. The signature scheme we propose is based on the existence of "claw-free" permutation pairs; informally, these are permutations fo and fl over a common domain for which it is computationally infeasible to find a triple x, y, and z such that fo(x)=f(y)= z (a "claw" or "f-claw"--see Fig. 1 (x) and X"f?l(x).
(3) For all (claw-making) algorithms I(.,., .,.) s4, for all c and sufficiently large k:
Note. It would be possible to use a variant of the above definition, in which the function f may actually return answers for inputs outside of D as long as it is understood that the difficulty of creating a "claw" applies to all x, y for which the function f returns an answer. Thus, it should be hard to find any triplet (x,y, z) We now show that G is a trap-door permutation generator. Assume for contradiction that it is not the case. Namely, there exists a constant c> 0 and an inverting algorithm I(.,., .,. ) s such that for infinitely many k:
Note now, that since fl is a permutation, algorithms fl(d (.)) and d (.) both define the uniform probability distribution over [d( )] . Thus, for infinitely many k,
Let I(.,., .,.) be the following inverting algorithm" On input 1 k, d, fo and compute x-d( ), z f(x), y-[(1 k, d, fo, z) and output (x, y,z) .
Then, I is in s and for infinitely many k,
This contradicts G being a claw-free permutation generator and thus G must be a trap-door permutation generator.
We note, however, that the converse to the above claim may be false. For example, the pair of ("RSA") permutations over Z,*= {1 <-x <-n" gcd (x, n)= 1}, defined by fo(x) x (mod n) and f(x)--x (mod n) (where gcd (b(n), 15)= 1) is not claw-free" since the two functions commute it is easy to create a claw by choosing w at random and then defining x-=fa(w), y =-fo(w), and z =fo(x)=-fa(Y) =-w as (mod n).
However, it is likely that fo and fa are trap-door permutations.
In practice, one may want to relax the definition of a claw-free permutation pair generator slightly, to allow the generator to have a very small chance of outputting functions fo and fl which are not permutations. We do not pursue this line of development in this paper. 6.3. Claw-free permutations exist if factoring is hard. The assumption of the existence of claw-free pairs is made in this paper in a general manner, independent of any particular number-theoretic assumptions. Thus, instances of our scheme may be secure even if factoring integers turns out to be easy. However, for concretely implementing our scheme the following is suggested. We first make an assumption about the intractability of factoring, and then exhibit a claw-free permutation pair generator based on the difficulty of factoring.
Notation. Let Hk:{n:p" q[ipl=lql=k,p=-3 (mod8), q=-7(mod8)} (the set of composite numbers which are the product of two k-bit primes which are both congruent to 3 modulo 4 but not congruent to each other modulo 8), and let
H=UkH.
Remark One way to choose "hard" instances for all known factoring algorithms seems to be to choose k to be large enough and then to choose n randomly from Hk.
These numbers were used in [Wi80] and their wide applicability to cryptography was demonstrated by Blum in [B182] ; hence, they are commonly referred to as "Blum integers."
Let Qn denote the set of quadratic residues (mod n). We note that for n H:
-1 has Jacobi symbol +1 but is not in Qn; 2 has Jacobi symbol -1 (and is not in Qn). We also note that every x Qn has exactly one square root y Q,, but has four square roots y, -y, w, -w altogether (see [B182] for proof). Roots w and -w have Jacobi symbol -1, while y and -y have Jacobi symbol +1.
The following assumption about the intractability of factoring is made throughout this section.
Intractability Assumption for Factoring (IAF). Let A be a probabilistic polynomialtime (factoring) algorithm. Then for all constants c > 0 and sufficiently large k 1 P(x is a nontrivial divisor of n[n Hk( ); x-A(n))<--77. The common domain of these functions is ()=1 and 0<x < n/2}; it is easy to see that the range of these functions is included in Dn for n H. Note also that it is easy to test whether or not a given element x is a member of Dn, since x and y in Dn such that fo,(x)=fl,n(y) (mod n) (i.e., a claw-creating algorithm) then factoring is easy. Suppose such an x and y have been found. Then x 2 4y 2 (mod n).
(Note that x e----4y 2 (mod n) is impossible: since 4y e is a quadratic residue (mod n), -4y
2 cannot be a quadratic residue (mod n), for n H.) This implies that (x +2y) (x-2y)-=0 (mod n). Moreover, we also know that x +2y (mod n), since (x/n)= 1 and (2y/n)=-1. Thus gcd (x+2y, n) will produce a nontrivial factor of n.
6.4. An infinite set of pairwise claw-free permutations. For our scheme we need not only claw-free pairs of permutations, but an infinite family of permutations which are pairwise claw-free and generated by a single claw-free pair f= (d, fo,f For this to work, when the signer A reveals f-(y), he should not enable anyone else to compute f-(y) for any other j.
The signer achieves this in our scheme by coding using a prefix-free mapping (.). This prevents an enemy from computing f(x) from f,(x) in an obvious way since (j) is never a prefix of (i). The following Lemma 1 shows that this approach is not only necessary but sufficient.
Note. Actually, the mapping (.) that we use is a one-to-one mapping from tuples of strings of bits to strings of bits. The mapping (.) is prefix-free in the sense that (al," ", an) is never a prefix of (bl,. ., b,,) unless n rn and a b,..., Any prefix-free mapping is usable if it and its (partial) inverses are polynomial-time computable and the lengths of a,..., an and (a,-, a,) are polynomially related.
For concreteness, we suggest the following encoding scheme for the tuple of strings a,. ., a,. Each string ai is encoded by changing each 0 to 00 and each 1 to 11, and the encoding is followed by 01. The encodings of al,..., an are concatenated and followed by 10.
Lemma 1 essentially says that if (d, fo, fi) is a claw-free pair, then it will be hard to find two different tuples of strings and j, and elements x and y such that f(i)( x ---f(j)(y). LEMMA 1. Let f= (d, fo, f) be a claw-free pair, x and y be elements of d and i, j two different tuples of binary strings such that there exists a string z such that z f(j>(y). Then there exists an f-claw (x, x2, x3) where x3 f[ (z) for some prefix c of (i).
Proof Let c {0, 1}* be the longest common prefix of (i) and (j). Such a c must exist since (.) is a prefix-free encoding scheme. Thus, setting x3 <--f-(z), x <-f-o(Z), and x<-f(z), we obtain an f-claw (x, x2, x3). (If c is the empty string then fdenotes the identity function, so x3 z.) Note that the f-claw is easily computed from f x, and y. [:] 7. Building blocks for signing. In this section we define the basic building blocks needed for describing our signature scheme. In 8, we will define what a signature is and how to sign, using the objects and data structures introduced here.
Assumption. We assume from here on that all claw-free functions used are defined over domains which do not include the empty string e.
This assumption is necessary since we use e as a "marker" in our construction; note that it is easy, via simple recodings, to enforce this construction if necessary.
We begin by defining the essential notion of an f-item. DEFINITION Note that given a claw free pair f and a tuple it is easy to check if the tuple is an f-item by applying the appropriate ji> to the tag, and checking if the correct root is obtained. For efficiency considerations, our signature scheme will organize a collection of a special-type of f-chains in the treelike structure defined below.
DEFINITION. Let be a binary string of length b and f a claw-free pair. An f-i-tree is a bijection T between DFS (i) and a set of f-items such that:
(1) if string j has length b, then T(j) is an f-item with exactly two children, exactly one of which is e, the empty string. These f-items are called bridge items.
(2) if string j has length less than b, then T(j) is an f-item with exactly two children, Co and Cl, both of which are nonempty strings. Moreover, Co, the Oth child, is the root of T(jO) and Cl, the 1st child, the root of T(jl). of "g-items," which are not part of the f-100 tree but are attached to it in a manner to be described.)
There are two reasons for letting the bridge items of an f-i-tree have the empty string as one of their children. First, it makes them de facto f-items with only one child, a subtle point in our proof of security that is pointed out in Remark 1. Second, it makes them distinguishable from items with two children, a simple point used, for instance, in Lemma 2.
8. Description of our signature scheme. 8.1. Message spaces. The security properties of the new signatures scheme hold for any nonempty message space M c {0, 1}+.
8.2. How to generate keys. We assume the existence of a claw-free permutation pair generator G and, without loss of generality, that the bound B on the number of signatures that can be produced is a power of 2: B 2b.
The key-generation algorithm K runs as follows on inputs 1 k and 2b:
(1) K runs G twice on input 1 k to secretly and randomly select two quintuples (dr, fo,f',f,,f?' and (dg, go, gl,g,,g-(')6[G(lk)].
(2) K then randomly selects r{ in D r [dr( )].
(3) K outputs the public key PK =(f, rf, g, 2b) where f is the claw-free pair (dr, fo,f,) and g is the claw-free pair (dg, go, gl).
(4) K outputs the secret key SK (f-', g-'). The PK and SK so produced are said to be (matching) keys of size k. In practice, it will be undesirable for user A to precompute and store all of T. He will instead "grow" T as needed and try to optimize his use of storage and time. This is taken into account by our signing procedure. In what follows, we describe a variation of our signing method that requires the signer to remember just his secret key and his most recently produced signature, in order to produce his next signature. The reader may find it helpful to refer to Fig. 3 while reading this description.
The signing procedure (also called ff'9). We presume that the procedure is initialized with the values of the public key PK and the corresponding secret key SK in its local private storage, that has already signed messages mo, m,..., m_ and kept track of the number of previous messages signed (i.e., the variable i= io" ib-, which is a b-long bit string, which may contain leading O's), and the most recent signature produced.
To compute a signature for message mi, the ith message, user A performs the following steps.
(1) Output f-chain.) (1.1) (Output f-items in common with previous signature.) If 0 b this substep is skipped, and control passes to step (1.2). Otherwise, for each string j which is a common prefix of and i-1, he outputs the f-item (tf, rf; rfo, rfl) which was part of the signature for message mi_, in order of increasing length of j.
(1.2) (Output new f-items in f-tree.) For each string j (if any) which is a proper prefix of i, but not a prefix of i-1, user A creates and outputs an f-item T(j), in order of increasing length ofj. The f-item T(j)= (tf, rf; rfo, r) is created as follows" Ifj e its root rf is the r{ from the public key; otherwise it is the kth child of the most recently output f-item, where k is the last bit of the string j. The children rfo and ri of the f-item with root rf are chosen at random from D-. The tag tf=fio,r>(r f) is computed using f-and ffrom the secret key. Note that the last item output (by either step (1.1) or (1.2)) has r{ as one of its children. (1.3) (Output bridge f-item.) User A next outputs a single f-item with root r( and g whose children are e and r, a randomly chosen element from Dg. The tag t{ for this item is again computed using the secret trap-door information for inverting fo and f.
(2) (Output g-item.) Finally, user A outputs the g-item G (t, r; rn). The tag t for this item is computed using the g-from the secret key.
The items output by the above procedure constitute a signature for mi. Notice that there are many possible signatures (among which A chooses one at random) for each occurrence of each message, but only one signature is actually output.
The reader may verify that the above procedure for producing a signature will have a total running time which is bounded by a polynomial in k and b.
Notice that if A has signed messages, the function T mapping each string j DFS(i) to f-item T(j) is an f-i-tree as defined in 7.
8.5. How to verify a signature. Given A's public key (f r s, g, 2b), anyone can easily verify that the first b + 1 elements in the signature of mi are f-items forming an f-chain starting at r and ending at r, and that the g-item in the signature has r/g as its root and mi as its only child. If these checks are all satisfied, the given sequence of items is accepted as an authentic signature by A of the message mi.
It is easy to confirm that these operations take time proportional to b times some polynomial in k, the size of the public key. Another relevant measure of efficiency is "amortized" time. That is, the time used for producing all possible 2 b signatures divided by 2. In our scheme, the amortized "f-inversion" cost is O(k). The amortized "g-inversion" cost is 0(I) if the average length of a message is 1.
The length of the signature for rn is O(bk+ 1), where is the length of m, as m is included in rn's signature as the child of the g-item. Clearly, if m is known to the signature recipient, the g-item need not include m: it suffices to give its root and its tag. This way the length of the signature can be only O(bk) long, which is independent of the length of m and possibly much shorter.
The memory required by the signing algorithm is O(bk), since it consists of storing (the f-items in) the most recently produced signature.
9. Proof of security. Let us start by establishing a convenient terminology. DEFINITION. We call signature corpus the first (for some > 0) signatures output by our signing procedure 6e. We shall generally use the symbol b to denote a signature corpus.
We define the following quantities relative to a signature corpus b , consisting of signatures relative to a public key PK (f, rye, g, 2).
(1) The set of items of S, denoted by (5e), is the set of the items in the signatures of Ae.
(2) The set of f-items of 6e, denoted by f(b), is the set off-items in (6e).
(3) The set of g-items of 6e, denoted by g(Ae), is the set of g-items in (4) The set of messages of b , denoted M(6e), is the set of messages signed by i.e., the set of children of the g-items of (5) The f-tree of 6e, denoted by -Y(Ae), is the f-i-tree having root r y and, as path to leaf j (j 0,..., i), the f-chain of the jth signature of (6) The set of internal nodes of b , denoted by (b), is the set of the internal nodes of -f(s).
(7) The set of nonroots of , denoted by (ow), is the set of those internal nodes of 3-f(5e) that are not the root of any f-item of ow. We may think of these nodes as "hooks" from which additional f-items will be grown as new signatures are created.
(8) The set of leaves of 0 , denoted (Sf), is the set of leaves of Notice that all the above sets are unambiguously defined. For instance, an item in f(3) has exactly two children while an item in g(Se) only one, the bridge elements of (6e) have exactly one empty child and thus are distinguishable from other items in f(Sf), and so on.
Some of these definitions can be observed in Fig. 3 . For example, the leaves of f rofol rof rofl rlfoo and its nonroots are rlfol and r. the f-100-tree in Fig. 3 are rooo, o, 1, Let us now see how the signature of a message never signed before relates to a given signature corpus.
LEMMA 2. Let 3 be a signature corpus relative to a public key PK (f, rye, g, 2b) and let (r be a signature (relative to the same public key) of a message m not belonging to M (3). Denote by (tr) the set of items in r. Then (or) (6f) the set of new items) contains either
(1) a g-item with root r (6f), or (2) an f-item with root r Proof First notice that (cr)- (3) is not empty as it contains G, the g-item of o-. In fact, G cannot belong to f(3), as it is a g-item, and cannot belong to g(Se), as m is its only child and all items in g(Se) have elements of M(3) as their children.
Assume (r)-(Se) also contains an f-item. Then this f-item belongs to F, the f-chain of o-whose first item has r{ as root, one of the internal nodes of 5f. Thus, for some item in F, (2) holds. Assume now that (o-)-(Se)--G. Then the root of G is the nonempty child of B, the bridge f-item of o-. By hypothesis, B is in (Se); thus, the root of G belongs to (Se) and (1) holds.
Recall Lemma 1 from 6.4: LEMMA 1. Let f--(d, fo,f) be a claw-free pair, x and y be elements of d and i, j be two different tuples of binary strings such that there exists a string z such that z= f(i>(x) =f(>(y). Then there exists an f-claw (x, x2, x3) where x3= fl(z) for some prefix c of i).
We can now prove Lemma 3: LEMMA 3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm A that, on input, a corpus 3 relative to a public key PK (f rYe, g, 2b) and the signature (r of message not belonging to M 3) finds either (1) a g-claw, or (2a) an f-claw, or (2b) an f-item whose root belongs to f(3). Proof (The cases are numbered according to the corresponding cases in Lemma 2.) If ease (1) of Lemma 2 holds for 5f and o-, then we have two g-items with the same root r in (Se). Namely, an i, j, x and y such that g<i>(x)--g<>(y)= r and we get a g-claw by Lemma 1. Otherwise, if case (2) of Lemma 2 holds, let F be the f-item that satisfies condition (2) of Lemma 2. If F has the same root as some F'f(Se), then again by Lemma 1, we get an f-claw; otherwise, we get an f-item whose root belongs to Af(6e). [3 Remark 1. Notice that if o-is generated by the legal signer (i.e., the 5e procedure) then, with very high probability, case (2b) will hold in Lemma 3.
In the proof of the main theorem we will assume that there exists a successful adaptive chosen-message attack, and derive a contradiction by showing that this attack would enable an enemy to easily create either an f-claw or a g-claw with sufficiently high probability. Recall that in an adaptive chosen-message attack the enemy can repeatedly use the real signer as an "oracle" before attempting to forge a new signature. The next lemma, Lemma 4, essentially states that the signing process can be simulated perfectly by an efficient algorithm that knows the public key and only half of the secret key: the inverses of the first claw-free pair. (That is, in some sense, this algorithm is a forger.)
To state Lemma 4, additional notation regarding "interactive" probabilistic algorithms, needs to be introduced. The notion of an adaptive, chosen-message attack involves the interaction of two algorithms: 5e9 (the signer) and 5e (the signature requestor). These algorithms "take turns": 5e requests a signature of a given message, owow signs it, 5e requests a second signature, 5eSe signs it, and so on. We might view the two routines as "co-routines" that pass control back and forth while preserving their own state. We formalize this interaction by means of the combining algorithm that defines a composite algorithm from two auxiliary ones. The combining algorithm c will invoke repeatedly 5eSe and ow in alternation, corresponding to their taking turns. The algorithms 5eSe and 9 have private-state variables (denoted V and V) that are preserved from invocation to invocation. Algorithm Scow (which produces signatures) takes as input a public key PK, an auxiliary input X (which for the moment is unspecified but will later denote either the corresponding secret key SK or part of it), a new message to sign, and its private-state variable. It produces as output a signature for the new message and an updated version of its private-state variable. Similarly, 9 is a probabilisitic algorithm which takes as input a public key, a sequence of previous signatures relative to that public key, and its private-state variable, and produces as output a message to be signed and an updated version of its private-state variable.
The following algorithm makes specific the process of combining owSe and ALGORITHM ((oq)oqa, 5e; PK, X, i) Set Set E and E to . Here denotes the signature of the jth message. We extend our notation of probabilistic algorithm in a natural way by letting c(99, 9; PK, X, i) represent the probability space that assigns the sequence tr the probability that c outputs tr after invoking alternatively (for times) owow (with initial input PK and X) and 9 (with initial inputs PK).
We can now state Lemma 4, stating that the signing process can be simulated effectively if the f/'s inverses are known but the gi inverses are not.
LEMMA 4. There exists an algorithm 4 in 4 such that for all requestors 5 4, for all public keys PK (f, r f, g, 2b) and for all nonnegative integers < 2b, c(4, 9; PK, {f-l}, i)= c(9, 9; PK, SK, i) (where 9 is the legal signing process of 8, and SK is the corresponding secret key to PK).
Proof. Consider the following algorithm .We inductively assume that (, 9; PK, {f-l}, i-1)= c(9, 9; PK, SK, i-1).
Thus the f-chains in the first i-1 signatures output by c uniquely define an f-(i-1)-tree T. Algorithm stores i-1 and the f-chain of the last produced signature and executes the following instructions to sign m, the ith message, where io" lb.
(1) ( (4) (Outputsignature of mi) Output T(e), T(io), ", T(io ib-), the newbridge item T(io,.'', ib) and the new g-item. [3 -1 In Lemma 6 we show a similar result: the signing process can be simulated if g is known, but f-is not. The proof of Lemma 6 makes essential use of the fact that there is a known upper bound on the number of signatures to be produced. (The bound provides a limit on the amount of a preprocessing step that is the subject of Lemma 5.)
There is, however, a very important difference between the signing simulation procedure described in Lemma 4 (which uses f-but not g-) and that of Lemma 6
(which uses g-but not f-). The proof of Lemma 4 works with any fixed root r, which can be fixed arbitrarily before the simulation procedure is invoked.
By contrast, the signing simulation procedure of Lemmas 5 and 6 actually produces the necessary root r{ to be part of the public key in its preprocessing step. The root produced is uniformly distributed over Ds. Thus, from the point of view of an observer that monitors the behaviour of the signer when he publishes his public key, the preprocessing step is indistinguishable from a genuine key generation step. Moreover, by monitoring the signing process, the observer cannot tell whether the signer really knows f-or if he has first applied the preprocessing procedure of Lemma 5 to produce his public file and only then applied the simulation procedure of Lemma 6. DEFINITION. For all strings ml,..., mi, let sequence(m,..., mi) denote the trivial interactive algorithm that, no matter what inputs it gets, when invoked for the jth time (j 1,..., i) outputs the string m.
Let us define two probability spaces over the f-i-trees which are crucial to our analysis.
DEFINITION. Let PK (f, r{, g, 2b) and SK (f-, g-) be a pair of matching public and secret key, where f= (dy, fo,fl) . Recall that c is the combining algorithm.
Define two probability spaces, -,p: and -,y,g, as follows: -i,pl is generated by randomly selecting ow in (5, sequence(ml, , m); PK, SK, i) and then computing -Y(). (Note that -,p/ does not depend on the values of the messages m,. ., mi but it does depend on i, the number of messages.) -,y,g,2 is generated by randomly selecting in c(, sequence(ml,..., mi); (f, dy(), g, 2b), SK, i) and then computing -Y().
Informally, -i,pl is the probability space obtained from -,y,g,2 by randomly picking rY Dy and fixing it in PK.
Notice that both probability spaces are easily generated if the secret key SK (f-, g-i) is among the available inputs. However, both probability spaces remain easy to generate on a more restricted set of inputs. It has been implicitly proved in Lemma 2 that -,p: can be generated in probabilistic polynomial-time on inputs i, PK and f-1 alone. The following lemma shows that -,.r,g2 is easily generated on inputs Proof Consider the following algorithm that constructs an f-i-tree T in "reverse order"; that is, it constructs f-item T(x) before f-item T(y) LEMMA 6. There exists an algorithm ag Ygag such that for all signature requestors 5t'Y Rag, for all claw-free pairs f d, fo, f ) and g dg, go, gl), and for all nonnegative integers < 2b, cg(sd, 5F; (f ds(), g, 2b), {g-l}, i)= (5, oc'; (f dr(), g, 2b), {f-l, g-l}, i).
Proof Consider the following algorithm ag. In a preprocessing step, a runs algorithm -of Lemma 5 to randomly select an f-i-tree T from T,,g,2. Let r{ be the root of T. This root is used to construct the public file PK (f, r{, g, 2b), with respect to which all subsequent signatures will be produced as follows, ag starts the signature requestor owS on input PK. Then it simulates the signing procedure with initial inputs PK and the corresponding secret key SK (f-, g-) without usingf -1 in the following way. When outputs mj, the jth message to be signed, a retrieves the f-chain T, the path from the root of T to leaf j. Then a computes the necessary g-item by using g Before stating and proving our Main Theorem, let us single out a simple lemma stating that one cannot invert a claw-free pair on a randomly selected input of its domain.
LEMMA 7. Let G be a claw-free permutation pair generator. Then, for any inverting algorithm I Rag, any c > 0 and sufficiently large k,
Proof Otherwise the following algorithm would find a claw with too high a probability: randomly select y in dh, randomly select between 1 and 2, compute x= hi(y) and run I to get z such that h(z)---x for j
We are now ready to formally state and prove our Main Theorem. We start by strengthening the definition of existentially forgeable to include probabilistic success on the part of the forger. DEFINITION. We say that a signature scheme is e-existentially forgeable if it is existentially forgeable with probability e where the probability space includes the random choices of the adaptive chosen-message attack, the random choices made by the legal signer in the creation of the public key, and the random choice made by the legal signer in producing signatures.
It is very important to note that the random choices made in creating the public key are included in the probability space; our proof depends critically on this definition. The Main Theorem of this paper is the following. (1') there is an infinite set K1 so that for k K1 (2') there is an infinite set K2 so that for k K2 (3') there is an infinite set K so that for k K3
We will show that either case leads to a contradiction. Then run oo on input 6e and PK.
Assume that case (2') holds. Then, for k e K2, from the output of Algorithm 2 an h-claw can be computed with sufficiently high probability to violate the claw-freeness of G.
Finally, assume that case (3') holds and k K3. Then, given a random x dh(),
the following algorithm will invert h on x with nonnegligible probability (contradicting Lemma 7). 5 runs Algorithm 2 except that, when constructing -h (Oo) as in Lemma 5, it makes x the value of a randomly selected nonroot of 5. Notice that this operation does not change the probability distribution of 5e. (Recall that the preprocessing procedure of Lemma 5 just picks at random all the internal nodes of ow.) Thus ow is a random signature corpus with respect to a randomly selected public key of size k. Thus, from the output of Algorithm 2, 5 computes an h-item with root r with probability 63(k)> 1/3Q(k). When this happens, with probability 1/IA/' (Se)l, we have r= x. Now, given the h-item computed, 5 can easily compute either h'(x) or h-('(x), and Lemma 7 is contradicted. This completes the proof of the Main Theorem. 10. Variations and improvements. In this section we describe ways to improve the efficiency of the proposed signature scheme without affecting its security.
10.1. Using &'s to sign rather than gT"s. This variation is of interest if it is substantially easier to compute go or g, than to compute their inverses. In this case steps (3) and (4) in the signing procedure can be replaced by:
(3) (Output g-item.) User A selects a random tDg, and (using go and computes the root r of the g-item (t, r; m), and outputs this item.
(4) (Output bridge f-item.) Using his knowledge of f-' and f-', user A outputs an f-item with root r( and an only child r g. Now each usage of gff or g-i has been replaced by a usage of go or gl.
Although one might be tempted to use this variation using one-way permutations instead of trap-door permutations for the gi's, this temptation should be resisted, since our proof of security does not hold if this change is made.
10.2. Fast iterated square roots. As we saw in 6.3, if factoring is computationally hard, a particular family of trap-door permutations is claw-free. By using these permutations in a straightforward manner, we obtain a particular instance of our signature scheme. Let us discuss the efficiency of this instance. The computation of f (x) consists of computing the square root which has Jacobi symbol 1 and is less than n/2, modulo a Blum-integer n. We can compute f?(x) as f(x/4). Computing g(x) and g-((x) is the same, except for using the appropriate n. If n is k-bits long, this can be done in O(k3) steps. Thus the signature of a k-bit message can be computed in time O(b" k4), or in O(k4) amortized time.
This particular instance of our scheme can be improved in a manner suggested in discussions with Oded Goldreich (see [Go86] --we appreciate his permission to quote these results here). The improvement relates to the computation of f(x) (or We note first of all that taking square roots modulo n is equivalent to taking uth powers modulo n, where u. 2--1 (mod 4(n)), and where 4(n) is Euler's phi function.
More generally, to find a 2th root of x modulo n one can raise x to the vth power modulo n, where v-= u (mod 4(n)). Computing by first computing v and then raising x to the vth power is substantially faster than repeatedly taking square roots.
To apply this observation, we note that the functions defined in 6.3 satisfy rrev((y))
where "rev" is the operation which reverses strings and interprets the result as an integer, where m is the length of (y), where all operations are performed modulo n, and where the final sign is chosen to make the result less than n/2. The only computationally difficult portion here is computing a 2"th root. Using the observation of the previous paragraph, the computation of such an f-inverse can be performed in time proportional to the cube of the length of n, in the case that messages have the same length k as n. Using these ideas, the signature of a k-bit message can be computed in time O(b. k3), or in O(k3) amortized time.
10.3. "Memoryless" version of the proposed signature scheme. The concept of a random function was introduced by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali in [GGM84] . Let Ik denote the set of k-bit integers. Let Wk denote the set of all functions from I to I, and let F W be a set of functions from Ik to I. We say that F--t_J F is a polyrandom collection if:
(1) Each function in F has a unique k-bit index associated with it. Furthermore, picking such an index at random (thereby picking an f e Fk at random) is easy.
(2) There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that given as input an index of a function f Fk and an argument x computes f(x).
(3) No probabilistic polynomial in k-time algorithm can "distinguish" between W and F. Formally, let T be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, that on input k and access to an oracle Oy for a function f: Ik I outputs 0 or 1. Then, for all T, for all polynomials Q, for all sufficiently large k, the difference between the probability that T outputs 1 on access to an oracle O s when f was randomly picked in Fk and the probability that T outputs 1 on access to an oracle Oy when f was randomly picked in Wk is less than 1/Q(k). Instead of picking values rff at random from Dg, he computes them as rf h(l-mj).
We claim that the "memoryless" version of the signature scheme described above enjoys the same security properties as our orignal scheme. The proof (which we shall not give in detail) is based on the observation that if the memoryless scheme was vulnerable to an adaptive chosen-message attack, then it would be possible to efficiently distinguish pseudorandom functions from truly random functions.
A further improvement (due to Oded Goldreich Go86)] removes even the necessity of remembering the number of previous signatures by picking the index for a message M as a random b-bit string. To make this work, the maximum number of signatures that can be produced by an instance of this scheme is limited to 2"/g, so that it is extremely unlikely that two messages would have the same index chosen for them.
The security proof can be modified to accommodate these changes. (Note that in the preprocessing step that builds an f-tree, we would now only build a portion of it ,/5-consisting of 2 randomly chosen paths of length b.)
ll. Ope problems.
It is an open question whether the RSA scheme is universally forgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack.
Can an encryption scheme be developed for which decryption is provably equivalent to factoring yet for which an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack is of no help to the enemy?
